Saturday, September 26, 2026

Q3 2027 Passive Income Update

The total amount of dividends collected in Q3 2026 is S$11,866.77, a 1.8% decrease YoY from Q3 2025's S$12,084.30.

Despite the year-on-year decline, I am satisfied with the progress of my passive-income portfolio. Dividend income continues to form an important part of my overall investment strategy, with the majority of my income coming from Singapore-listed dividend stocks, REITs and bonds.

Here is the breakdown of my passive income collected during Q3 2026:

DateInvestmentAmount
1 Jul            SSBS$244.50
1 Jul            SSBS$300.00
1 Jul            SSB (SRS)S$162.50
3 Aug            SSBS$239.25
3 Aug            SSBS$139.05
11 Aug            Astrea 9A1 PE BondS$185.46
25 Aug            DBSS$810.81
25 Aug            DBS (SRS)S$648.00
27 Aug            IREITS$119.31
28 Aug            Ascott REITS$253.20
28 Aug            Suntec REITS$100.00
28 Aug            OCBC (SRS)S$2,350.00
28 Aug            UOBS$880.00
31 Aug            ComfortDelGro (SRS)S$195.50
1 Sep            SSBS$150.50
1 Sep            SSBS$149.05
1 Sep            SSBS$138.00
2 Sep            Wilmar (SRS)S$75.00
7 Sep
8 Sep
            Mapletree Ind Trust
            Ascendas REIT
S$808.60
S$444.11
9 Sep            CapitaLand China TrustS$261.83
15 Sep            Keppel REIT (SRS)S$486.79
16 Sep            MPACTS$392.00
16 Sep            Mapletree Logistics TrustS$397.32
18 Sep            Keppel DC REIT (SRS)S$685.68
23 Sep            AIMS APAC REIT (DRP)S$831.99
25 Sep            CICTS$418.32
Total
S$11,866.77

Together with the S$21,486.93 passive income collected in the first half of 2026, my passive income in the first 9 months of 2026 is now:

S$33,353.70

This puts me S$3,353.70 above the S$30,000 milestone, and I am on track to achieve my target of S$42,000 passive income for 2026.

With one quarter still remaining, I need another S$9,454.91 in passive income to hit my S$42,000 target.

Building Multiple Streams of Passive Income

One thing I appreciate about my portfolio is that the passive income doesn't come from just one source.

This quarter, I collected income from SSBs, bonds, banks, REITs and dividend-paying companies.

The largest individual contributor was OCBC, which paid S$2,350 into my SRS account.

DBS contributed another S$1,458.81 across my regular and SRS holdings, while UOB contributed S$880.

The REIT portfolio also continued to generate meaningful cash flow, with distributions from IREIT, Ascott REIT, Suntec REIT, Ascendas REIT, CapitaLand China Trust, Keppel REIT, MPACT, Mapletree Logistics Trust, Keppel DC REIT, AIMS APAC REIT and CICT.

I also received interest from my Singapore Savings Bonds and Astrea 9A1 PE Bond.

I like having this diversification because different assets generate income at different times of the year.

Rather than relying on a single dividend payer, I am gradually building a portfolio where the cash flow is spread across multiple businesses and asset classes.

My options premiums are excluded from this passive income update as I deemed options trading as a part-time job requiring slight effort.

My tax-free dividends and options premiums easily surpass my active income from taxable and CPF-deductible salary. hence making early retirement an imminent reality rather than a distant goal. The foundation is set, the cash flow is proven, and the journey now is simply about maintaining discipline while enjoying the freedom it provides.

SRS Continues to Play an Important Role

Some of the dividends this quarter were received through my SRS portfolio.

In particular, the S$2,350 OCBC dividend, S$648 DBS dividend, S$195.50 ComfortDelGro dividend, S$486.79 Keppel REIT distribution and S$75 Wilmar dividend were received through SRS.

I continue to see SRS as an important component of my long-term wealth-building strategy.

The objective isn't simply to maximise the amount of money in SRS. Rather, I want the assets inside the account to eventually generate meaningful income while benefiting from the tax advantages of the SRS framework.

Over time, these dividends can be reinvested and compounded into an increasingly larger income-producing portfolio.

Time in the Market Beats Timing the Market

The investment philosophy remains unchanged:

Time in the market beats timing the market.

There will always be market corrections, recessions, geopolitical concerns and headlines predicting the next crash.

Trying to perfectly time every market move is extremely difficult.

In the long term, I am happy to remain primarily invested locally in SGX dividend stocks and REITs for passive income, while maintaining exposure to US technology stocks for capital growth.

The two sides of the portfolio serve different purposes.

My Singapore investments provide recurring cash flow.

My US technology holdings provide exposure to businesses with potentially stronger long-term growth.

I don't expect every investment to perform the same way every year. What matters is that the portfolio as a whole continues moving towards my long-term objectives.

Looking Ahead to Q4

I look forward to collecting more dividends and distributions in the final quarter of 2026.

At the same time, I will remain on the sidelines for great investment opportunities to acquire more income-producing assets and businesses.

There is no need to force an investment simply because I have cash available.

If valuations are attractive, I will deploy capital.

If markets become expensive, I am happy to wait.

Patience is part of investing.

Existentialism

My mission is simple: financial freedom with existentialism.

I direct my money with purpose. I invest to build assets that generate future cash flow or with growth potential, but I no longer view life purely through the lens of strict minimalism or future accumulation.

Life is finite. Remembering memento mori means understanding that time is the one asset I can never buy back. I embrace intentional splurges and small daily luxuries that bring genuine joy today, without guilt and without compromising my broader vision. This isn't about aimless consumerism—it's about living meaningfully in the present while securing the future.

Ultimately, I invest to buy true sovereignty:

  • Freedom of Time: Spending my hours on what truly matters.

  • Freedom of Money: Living unburdened by financial anxiety.

  • Freedom of Location: Achieving complete mobility and flexibility.

I work because I choose to, not because I have to.

I know market noise, volatility, and temporary distractions will always exist. I don't need to react to every cycle. I simply need to remain disciplined, accumulate quality assets, let compounding work over time, and balance future security with rich everyday experiences.

Time in the market beats timing the market.

The journey continues.

Thanks for reading.

With love and peace, 
Qiongster

Disclaimer: This article is for informational purposes only and is not financial advice. Readers should conduct their own research and consult with a financial professional before making any investment decisions.

Saturday, September 05, 2026

OCBC is cheap (undervalued) at $32.27. Not Kidding

I never thought I'd be writing this about OCBC (SGX:O39).

For years, OCBC was the bank that quietly sat in the background of Singapore portfolios.

DBS always stole the headlines.

UOB got plenty of attention.

And OCBC?

It was often the “boring third bank.”

Steady. Profitable. Dividend-paying.

But boring. Chinese. Old-school.

Then something changed.

Over the past 12 months, OCBC has surged roughly 86%, climbing from a 52-week low of $16.19 to around $32.27 yesterday, just a whisker below its 52-week high of $32.57.

That is not the kind of move you normally associate with a sleepy Singapore bank.

And it creates an uncomfortable question:

If the stock has already gone from $16 to $32, am I simply too late?

Maybe.

But after digging through the numbers, I'm not convinced the story is over.

In fact, I think $32.27 could still leave room for OCBC to surprise on the upside.

Not because I expect another 86% rally.

That's probably unrealistic.

But because the market may finally be recognising that OCBC is becoming something more interesting than the traditional Singapore bank investors thought they knew.

The Scoreboard

Before getting into the story, here are the numbers that caught my attention:
  • Market cap: ~S$139.5b, Singapore's second-largest bank by value, behind DBS (~S$216b), comfortably ahead of UOB (~S$67b)
  • Trailing P/E: ~17.8x | P/B: ~2.2x
  • TTM earnings: S$7.83b on revenue of S$14.7b, net margin north of 53%
  • 1H26 dividend: S$0.47, up 15% year-on-year, payout ratio ~51%
  • Q2 2026 net profit: S$2.22b, up 22% YoY
  • NPL ratio: ~0.9%, the lowest of Singapore's three local banks
  • Beta: 0.20, about as low-drama as a blue chip gets

And there's one number I find particularly interesting:

Q2 2026 was a record quarter.

Net profit reached S$2.22 billion, up 22% year-on-year.

So perhaps the more interesting question isn't:

“How much has OCBC already gone up?”

It's: “Has OCBC's earnings story improved faster than the market expected?”

I think there's a case for yes.

Case 1: The Rally Hasn't Completely Destroyed the Valuation

Let's get one thing out of the way.

I'm not going to pretend OCBC at $32 is the same bargain it was at $19–20.

That ship has sailed.

But valuation isn't necessarily a binary question of “cheap” or “expensive.”

Different valuation models are still pointing toward values above the current share price.

Simply Wall St's discounted cash flow model still pegs OCBC's fair value at S$39.32, implying the stock is trading around 18% below intrinsic value.

Excess Returns Model Points to an intrinsic value around S$35.96, driven by solid return on equity expectations.

Professional brokerage consensus targets average around S$34.18, pointing to a modest upside from current trading levels.

Valuation models are assumptions wrapped in spreadsheets.

Change the assumptions and you change the answer.

But they do tell us something important:

The market isn't unanimously saying OCBC has become wildly overvalued.

Q2 revenue reached S$4.01 billion, up 17% year-on-year.

Net profit rose 22%.

That is not simply a stock price story.

The earnings are catching up.

Case 2: The Quiet Transformation: OCBC Is Becoming Less of a Bank

This might be the most important part of the entire thesis.

For decades, the basic Singapore bank formula was relatively straightforward:

Take deposits → make loans → earn the spread.

But interest rates don't stay high forever.

As SORA drifts lower, net interest margins come under pressure.

That means the next battleground isn't simply:

“Who has the biggest loan book?”

It's:

“Who can make the most money outside the traditional lending business?”

And this is where OCBC gets interesting.

In Q2 2026, non-interest income jumped 51% year-on-year.

That's huge.

The bank is increasingly making money from wealth management, insurance, fees and other businesses rather than relying entirely on the interest-rate cycle.

And OCBC isn't just throwing money at the problem.

It's using technology.

Bank of Singapore's HELIOS AI platform is cutting private-wealth client onboarding from more than 30 business days to 15, with full rollout targeted for this year.

OCBC WoW is extending AI-powered wealth advisory to affluent customers around the clock.

At the same time, OCBC is aggressively expanding its relationship-manager network.

In Jakarta alone, it plans to double relationship managers to 400 following the HSBC Indonesia retail and wealth acquisition.

Group-wide, another 600 relationship managers are being hired.

Put all of this together and something interesting emerges.

OCBC isn't simply defending its old business.

It's building a new one.

Case 3: You're Paying More Than Before But You're Also Getting More

This is where the valuation argument gets nuanced.

At the beginning of 2026, OCBC was trading at roughly:

12.2x earnings

and

1.49x book value.

DBS was trading at roughly:

14.8x earnings

and

2.39x book value.

That valuation gap was difficult to ignore.

Especially because OCBC's asset quality was arguably just as impressive, if not better.

Today, after the massive re-rating, OCBC sits around 17.8x earnings and 2.2x book.

So yes.

The discount has narrowed dramatically.

But perhaps that isn't OCBC becoming irrationally expensive.

Perhaps it's simply OCBC finally catching up.

For years, DBS enjoyed the premium valuation.

Now the market appears to be asking whether OCBC deserves more of it.

Case 4: There Might Be Crouching Tigers & Hidden Phoenixes Sitting Quietly on the Balance Sheet

This was the rabbit hole that really caught my attention.

When people value a bank, they usually look at:

Loans.

Deposits.

Net interest margins.

Wealth management.

Capital ratios.

Almost nobody talks about the land underneath the bank.

This was the part that made me dig into OCBC's actual financial statements rather than relying on somebody else's summary.

OCBC reports around:

S$4.294 billion of property, plant and equipment

and another

S$609 million of investment property.

And here's the interesting part.

The accounts are prepared under the historical cost convention.

In simple English:

Some of these properties aren't sitting on the balance sheet at today's market value.

They're sitting there based on what they cost, less depreciation.

That matters when you're talking about a bank that has operated in Singapore since 1912.

And OCBC's history in Singapore makes the property angle particularly fascinating.

We're not talking about a company that arrived here ten years ago and bought a few office buildings.

OCBC has been operating in Singapore since 1912.

Over generations, it accumulated a substantial property portfolio.

And when you go through its historical annual reports, the numbers become rather eye-opening.

Take the heart of the CBD.

65 Chulia Street — OCBC Centre.

63 Chulia Street — OCBC Centre East.

18 Church Street — OCBC Centre South.

63 Market Street — Bank of Singapore Centre.

OCBC's 2018 annual report showed market values of approximately:

  • S$1.10 billion for 65 Chulia Street
  • S$377.4 million for 63 Chulia Street
  • S$170.7 million for 18 Church Street
  • S$472 million for 63 Market Street

That's roughly S$2.12 billion across just those four properties based on the disclosed 2018 market values.

And those aren't random buildings somewhere in Singapore.

They're sitting right in the heart of the CBD.

OCBC Centre itself is arguably one of the most recognisable bank headquarters in Singapore.

OCBC's own current website still lists 65 Chulia Street as its headquarters, while 63 Chulia Street houses OCBC Bank's head office.

But here's where my curiosity really went up another level.

The Shophouses

From looking through past property transactions and OCBC's historical property footprint, I believe OCBC still owns tens of dozens of conserved shophouses and other prime Singapore properties, although I cannot independently establish the exact number that remains in the group's ownership today.

And I want to make that distinction clear.

I'm not claiming that every shophouse OCBC ever owned is still sitting there today.

But the historical evidence for a substantial portfolio is real.

In 2015, OCBC was reported to be marketing more than 30 shophouses and shop units, with the majority described as investment properties.

That gives you a sense of the scale of what the bank has accumulated over the years.

And then you start looking at the locations.

Chulia Street.

Cecil Street.

Tanjong Pagar.

Robinson Road.

North Bridge Road.

And other parts of Singapore that have transformed dramatically over the past few decades.

This is where I think investors may be underestimating something.

Singapore property prices today bear almost no resemblance to what they were when some of these properties were originally acquired.

And OCBC is more than just a bank.

It is, in some ways, also a century-old owner of Singapore real estate.


The Accounting Makes It Even More Interesting

OCBC's own historical disclosures show just how different carrying values can be from market values.

In its 2018 major-properties table, for example, OCBC Centre at 65 Chulia Street had a reported carrying value of only around S$20 million, against a market value of approximately S$1.10 billion.

That's an extraordinary gap.

The same pattern appeared in other properties.

OCBC Centre East:

Carrying value: ~S$93 million

Market value: ~S$377 million

OCBC Centre South:

Carrying value: ~S$67 million

Market value: ~S$171 million

Bank of Singapore Centre:

Carrying value: ~S$274 million

Market value: ~S$472 million.

Now, I don't want to make the mistake of adding up historical market values and calling the difference “hidden cash.”

That's not how accounting works.

Property values change.

Ownership changes.

Assets get sold.

Buildings depreciate.

Redevelopment can change everything.

And historical disclosures don't automatically tell us what the current market value of every property is in 2026.

But the broader point is impossible to ignore:

A bank with more than a century of history in Singapore has accumulated real estate in some of the most valuable parts of the city.

Some of those properties were acquired decades ago.

Some have market values dramatically above their historical carrying values.

And some of the assets are arguably more interesting today than when they were acquired.


And OCBC Isn't Sitting Still

The Chulia Street story is particularly interesting because OCBC has itself explored what those properties could become.

The group has considered redevelopment of its CBD properties.

But there is another side to this story.

OCBC Centre isn't merely an asset on a balance sheet.

It's part of the bank's identity.

The building has heritage value.

The bank has continued to use the complex as a major operating base.

In other words:

The property may be worth billions, but OCBC doesn't necessarily want to sell it.

And that is important.

I don't see these properties as a short-term catalyst.

I don't expect OCBC to suddenly sell OCBC Centre and distribute the proceeds to shareholders.

That's not the thesis.

Instead, I see it as something much more subtle.

A margin-of-safety asset base sitting underneath the banking franchise.

If Singapore prime real estate continues to appreciate, OCBC shareholders own a business that participates in that value indirectly.

And perhaps that's one reason the market may underestimate what a century-old Singapore institution really owns.

Case 5: The Dividend Story Hasn't Finished

This is another part of the OCBC story that I find easy to underestimate.

Management's stated policy is roughly a 50% payout ratio on ordinary earnings.

The 1H26 dividend was S$0.47, up 15% year-on-year.

Here's the beautiful thing about a payout ratio.

The dividend doesn't need the payout ratio to rise forever.

It just needs earnings to rise.

If OCBC earns more and continues paying roughly 50% of those earnings to shareholders, the dividend naturally grows with the business.

In other words:

50% of a growing pie is still a growing slice.

And there's potentially another piece of the puzzle.

Back in February 2025, OCBC announced a S$2.5 billion capital return programme consisting of special dividends and a share buyback funded from surplus capital.

As of the latest management update, a substantial portion of the buyback remained to be deployed — roughly S$800 million to S$1 billion by my reading of the updates.

Management has indicated a preference to return the remaining capital through another special dividend, potentially alongside FY2026 results.

That's not guaranteed.

But it is not theoretical money either.

It's capital that has already been earmarked for shareholders.

Case 6: OCBC Isn't Just a Singapore Story

This is probably the part most people miss when they hear “Singapore bank.”

OCBC has significant exposure across Asia.

And some of those businesses are growing faster than the Singapore operation.

In FY2025:

Greater China pre-tax profit rose 31% to S$1.67 billion.

Malaysia wasn't far behind:

Pre-tax profit rose 21% to S$1.38 billion.

And then there's Bank of Ningbo.

Its contribution through OCBC's associate interests reached around S$1.08 billion in FY2025.

That's a significant earnings stream hiding inside the accounting line:

“Share of results of associates.”

Indonesia was weaker, with profit falling slightly to around S$493 million.

But I don't think the Indonesia story can simply be judged by the FY2025 numbers.

Those numbers don't fully reflect the newer strategy.

The HSBC Indonesia retail and wealth acquisition hadn't yet had time to play out.

OCBC is also doubling its Jakarta relationship-manager headcount to 400.

If Indonesia starts performing the way management expects, it could become another earnings leg.

The Wild Cards

So what could surprise the market from here?

I see several.

① The shift toward fee income

Non-interest income accounted for 44% of total income in 1H26, compared with 36% a year earlier.

That's not a small change.

If OCBC becomes structurally less dependent on interest income, perhaps the market eventually decides it deserves a higher valuation multiple.

② AI-driven productivity

HELIOS and OCBC WoW aren't just flashy technology projects.

If they genuinely allow OCBC to serve more customers with fewer manual processes, the impact eventually appears in the numbers.

Cost-to-income ratio already fell to 38.5% in 1H26.

More revenue.

Lower costs.

That's a combination investors tend to like.

③ The remaining capital return

There is still potentially S$800 million–S$1 billion of capital to return.

If that becomes a special dividend, shareholders will certainly notice.

④ Bank of Ningbo

A growing associate business doesn't get nearly as much attention as headline banking revenue.

But earnings don't care which line of the income statement they come from.

If the contribution continues growing, the market eventually has to account for it.

⑤ The property portfolio

This is the wild card I find most fascinating.

The banking business can be valued using earnings.

The insurance business can be valued using embedded value and profits.

The wealth-management business can be valued using fee income and growth.

But what happens when a century-old bank also owns prime Singapore real estate accumulated over generations?

How much of that value is already reflected in the share price?

That's much harder to answer.

And perhaps that's precisely why it is interesting.


But Here's Where I Pump the Brakes

This is where I refuse to turn this into a “BUY OCBC NOW!” article.

Because there are very real risks.

And frankly, anyone writing about a stock that has risen 86% in a year who doesn't discuss valuation is doing readers a disservice.

The analysts aren't exactly screaming “buy.”

The consensus price target from 15 analysts sits around S$29.65, below the current ~$31 price.

Simply Wall St's analyst-consensus view also suggests the stock may be overvalued at current levels.

The range is enormous.

That tells me something:

Nobody really agrees on what OCBC is worth anymore.

And that's important.

The dividend yield isn't what it used to be.

At $19–20, OCBC's yield was much more attractive.

At around $31, the yield has compressed to roughly 3.2%–3.5%.

That is now below DBS and UOB based on their current yields and capital-return profiles.

So if you're buying OCBC today purely for income?

I'd argue the case isn't nearly as compelling as it was a year ago.

And NIM is still under pressure.

Net interest margin has eased toward roughly 1.67%–1.70%.

If rates fall faster than expected, traditional banking earnings could face further pressure.

The fee-income transformation therefore isn't optional.

It's becoming increasingly important.

OCBC share price can correct or tanks 5%–10% a day when the economy stirs shit and weak institutional or retail shareholders dropped their pants.

I witnessed before my bloody eyes that investors dumped OCBC at $3.87 during the 2009 financial crisis when I was an NUS undergrad.

In Mar 2020 pandemic days, the same fuck shit happened when investors screwed OCBC till $7.80. 


So... Would I Buy OCBC at $32.27?

Here's where this article gets personal.

Yes.

But probably not for the reason you think.

I don't think OCBC at $32.27 is a screaming bargain.

I don't think $32.27 is the new $19.

And I certainly wouldn't tell someone to back up the truck simply because a DCF model says $39.

The easy re-rating has already happened.

But I still see something compelling here.

OCBC today is not necessarily the same OCBC the market was pricing at $19.

It's a higher-valued stock.

But it's also a business with:

  • record quarterly profits,
  • rapidly growing fee income,
  • a strong wealth-management franchise,
  • expanding Asian operations,
  • excellent asset quality,
  • growing dividends,
  • significant capital returns still in the pipeline,
  • and a century of Singapore property accumulated underneath the banking franchise.

So perhaps the right way to think about OCBC isn't:

“I missed the $19 entry.”

Perhaps it's:

“Has the business changed enough to justify a higher price?”

I think the answer is yes.

The harder question is:

How much higher?

That's where reasonable investors can disagree.


And Then There's My Own Little Secret

This is the part that changes the calculation for me personally.

I will still add OCBC around $32.27.

Why?

Because my effective net cost is only $6.29 per share after subtracting the dividends I've collected over the past seven years.

Read that again.

$32 on the screen doesn't feel like $32 to me.

That's the power of holding a dividend-paying business for a long time.

You collect.

You reinvest.

You wait.

And slowly, the economics of the position change.

Year after year.

Dividend after dividend.

Eventually, the psychological relationship with the stock becomes very different.

When I first bought OCBC, I was looking at:

“How much am I paying?”

Today, I'm increasingly thinking:

“How much has this investment already paid me?”

That's a very different mindset.


The Bigger Lesson

Maybe that's actually the most interesting part of this entire OCBC story.

Investing isn't always about finding the next 10-bagger.

Sometimes it's about finding a business good enough to hold for years while it quietly compounds underneath you.

You collect dividends.

The business grows.

The valuation changes.

The market changes its mind.

And one day you look at your original investment and realise:

the market price is no longer the whole story.

OCBC may or may not go to $35.

It may go to $40.

It may fall back to $25 first.

Nobody knows.

But I do know this:

I would rather own a profitable bank generating billions in earnings, returning capital to shareholders, expanding its wealth-management engine and sitting on a century of Singapore real estate than chase whatever happens to be the hottest stock on the screen today.

The boring third bank?

Maybe it isn't so boring anymore.

Maybe the market has finally noticed.

And perhaps the biggest surprise isn't that OCBC went from $16 to $32.57.

Perhaps the biggest surprise is that, after an 86% rally...

I still don't think the OCBC story is finished.

Not financial advice — just one FIRE-achiever's take on the numbers. Do your own due diligence before making any investment decision.

With love and peace,
Qiongster